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And now, the main event…

Today, Hudson’s Bay, the oldest company in Canada, began liquidating the majority of the 80 stores in its portfolio. The liquidation will provide, um, the liquidity to maintain the company’s six Canadian locations—including the flagship on Toronto’s Yonge Street—as American retail executive Liz Rodbell attempts to rebuild the enterprise, which began as a fur trading post in 1670. The store closures in Canada include three Saks Fifth Avenues and 13 Saks Off 5th outlets, currently operated via a licensing deal with Saks Global. Up until the end of last year, after all, Saks Fifth Avenue was a part of Hudson’s Bay Company ULC, a holdco chaired by real estate mogul Richard Baker, who also happens to be the chairman of Saks Global, the new American entity that includes Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, and Bergdorf Goodman—the latter two acquired in a transformative $2.7 billion deal at the end of 2024.

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Saks Global and Hudson’s Bay Company might technically be completely separate businesses now, but they are forever linked by Baker, who has earned a reputation for stopping at absolutely nothing to control as many buildings as he can. Baker deals in luxury mostly because his family business has been retail real estate. (His father was a mall developer.) But as department stores have turned into ghost towns, with consumers turning more frequently to the web for cheap goods, he continued to buy the dip. And now, for better or worse, that’s made him one of the most consequential people in fashion, at least at this moment. Baker and longtime deputy Marc Metrick, the C.E.O. of Saks Global, have been dealing with the repercussions of combining these three historic department store brands at a time when the entire industry is deeply challenged. Now, as Hudson’s Bay manages liquidation, industry executives are wondering whether Saks Global, too, could be on a path to a Chapter 11 restructuring. After all, Metrick sent that fateful and confidence-depleting Valentine’s Day love letter to brands outlining a plan to structure millions of dollars in backpay via monthly installments—starting in July, via a net 90 policy rather than the typical 30-day cycle. Pretty much everyone was infuriated, save for the likes of LVMH, Chanel, and Kering, which were immediately informed that they would be offered a preferred treatment. Many brands that had been holding off on shipping spring merchandise to Saks Global stores until they were made whole have since abstained. Rumors abound of top-selling brands pausing their relationship with the stores. Many Saks Global partner brands have noticed that the retailers’ buys for this fall are larger, perhaps to compensate for some missing labels. Some brand attrition is expected, and even encouraged. But Saks Global has also been forced to make compromises with dozens of brands that the business can’t afford to lose. In the past few days, I’ve been asking myself: Why did it have to go down like this? Fundamentally, I understand Metrick’s position that the status quo wasn’t working, and that operations needed to change in order to avoid ending up in the same situation as Hudson’s Bay. But there is more to it: Baker worked so hard to close the deal with Neiman Marcus Group that he may have made things a lot harder on the other side.

In recent days, I’ve uncovered a few things that help explain why Metrick felt it was necessary to take such a hard line with certain brands. In addition to the weighty closing costs, Saks Global faced concession bills that were owed to the likes of Chanel. (I’m told that Saks is nearly paid up on all due concession fees, and that Chanel has been paid in full.) There was also, of course, the money owed to wholesale partners. On top of that, I was told by insiders that Neiman Marcus Group overforecast the amount of inventory they would hold in 2025, meaning that Saks Global incorrectly expected a large windfall of inventory to borrow against. Opposing sources close to Saks said this is a mischaracterization, but the reality of the matter is that if there were more than enough money to pay everyone back immediately, they would. Other peculiarities of the deal are making it harder for Metrick to move forward, too. The company has those arrangements with G-III and Authentic Brands Group, which put Saks Global on the hook to invest in product that normally wouldn’t sit in a luxury department store. Following Amazon’s strategic investment in the merger, Saks is also launching on Amazon Luxury Stores.

But since most true luxury brands do not want to engage with Amazon, Metrick and his team are going to have trouble persuading them to come aboard. They’ve said they are not putting unwanted pressure on brands. And yet, they have to fill the shop, just like they have to fill Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, and Bergdorf Goodman. We should have a better sense of where this is all going soon. More layoffs are expected imminently, following another round in February.

In the 12 years since Baker acquired Saks Fifth Avenue, top brands have opened up a startling number of standalone stores in the U.S., rebalancing their sales to be majority direct-to-consumer—in some cases, as much as 90 percent. Chanel, Christian Dior, and Louis Vuitton have operated shop-in-shops at American department stores for years, but these rely on a compromised model. In some ways, concession is more efficient for a department store than the traditional wholesale arrangement: There’s no inventory cost, because the brand is operating the store, and even employing the sales team. But it’s not great for revenue, and it’s also harder to create an exciting store experience when there’s not a single narrative. It’s unclear whether this actually matters to Baker, whose goal is purely financial, even if he also enjoys taking his wife to runway shows during Paris Fashion Week. Before the Saks Global deal, the greatest coup of his professional life (at least in my eyes) was selling the Lord & Taylor building to WeWork Property Advisors for $850 million. And, for the right price, I’m sure he would do the same with his current portfolio. It’s all about dealmaking. And look, if the group were to go bankrupt, at least there’d be a clean slate. Maybe LVMH would make a play for Bergdorf Goodman after all.

Estée Lauder–owned affordable skincare line The Ordinary is selling “ordinary” eggs in New York as a marketing stunt. I wonder how much money they’re losing per box. [Instagram] Jean Touitou was in the room when Agnès B. designed the snap cardigan. [New York Times] The founder of LVMH-owned beauty brand Officine Universelle Buly addresses accusations that he’s a jerk. [Mediapart] Target thinks the Easter Bunny is going to save the next quarter. Unfortunately for Target, a lot of people who celebrate Easter have boycotted Target in recent months. [Retail Brew] Topshop is apparently relaunching. (It’s owned in a joint venture by Asos and Heartland, the office of the Holch Povlsen family, Danish retailers known for the store Bestseller.) Sounds like a terrible idea, don’t do it! [Grazia UK] The style of the 2020s will be defined by barrel-leg jeans. [Elle UK] Dua Lipa looks fab in Chanel, Valentino, Jean Paul Gaultier, and more on her tour. [Vogue]

And finally… Printemps Fever is real! Grown-ups are queueing! Until tomorrow, Lauren P.S.: We are using affiliate links because we are a business. We may make a couple bucks off them.

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