One week after Saks Global filed for bankruptcy, a picture is emerging of how the American department store conglomerate—a luxury retail behemoth encompassing Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, and Bergdorf Goodman—collapsed so quickly. Until recently, most of its financial information was private: With the exception of Saks Global’s debt, which was publicly traded, the company was not required to make any public filings with the S.E.C. Now, as part of the bankruptcy docket, hundreds of filings—more than 350 already—are shedding light on the financial difficulties that Saks experienced throughout 2025, starting just months after its $2.7 billion acquisition of Neiman Marcus Group. One document, in particular, stands out.

On January 14, Mark Weinsten, the newly appointed chief restructuring officer of Saks Global, wrote and signed a “declaration” that laid out in stark terms precisely what happened to Saks. Weinsten presumably knows the company as well as anyone: He was the chief restructuring officer at Neiman Marcus during its own 2020 bankruptcy proceeding, and most recently served as the interim C.F.O. of Saks Global. In his new role, he’ll be working closely with Geoffroy van Raemdonck, the new C.E.O. of Saks Global and former C.E.O. of Neiman Marcus. Weinsten will essentially be running the bankruptcy process for Saks Global while van Raemdonck operates the business.

A MESSAGE FROM GLENMEDE

The fall of Saks Global, in Weinsten’s telling, was primarily the consequence of leverage and liquidity issues. Despite the promise of the Neiman Marcus Group merger, as laid out in the $2.2 billion bond prospectus from December 2024, Weinsten wrote that “following the Acquisition, the Company faced immediate liquidity challenges, and the capital structure became unsustainable.” In the fiscal year and sales performance ending February 1, 2025, Weinsten revealed, Saks Global’s consolidated total revenue fell nearly 14 percent compared to the previous fiscal year, and was “softer than expected” in the second quarter of 2025. “Sustained liquidity issues” made it increasingly difficult to purchase the inventory to meet customer demand.

Some of these challenges might have been foreseeable. To fund the acquisition of Neiman Marcus Group and refinance its debt, Saks Global used the proceeds from the $2.2 billion junk bond, underwritten by Jefferies, plus $1.54 billion of new equity from the likes of Amazon and Richard Baker, among others, and a new asset-based lending facility, or ABL, and then some so-called “seller financing” from the former Neiman Marcus creditors. But problems beset Saks Global nearly immediately, Weinsten explained. Saks Global struggled to pay vendors on time, which “strained relations with brand partners.” In turn, he wrote, “Vendors were less willing to ship goods to the Company, leaving the Company unable to build an adequate amount of seasonal inventory leading into Spring of 2025.” It was a vicious cycle: The lack of inventory also led to a reduced “borrowing base” and reduced availability under the ABL facility, further exacerbating Saks’ liquidity issues. Last February, two months after closing the Neiman deal, Saks Global began “considering strategies to address these challenges,” Weinsten wrote. It made changes to its business model, such as extending payment terms to vendors from 30 days to 90 days. The company also worked to identify synergies—Weinsten says Saks Global still expects to “realize” $600 million in total “run-rate” synergies over the next four years—and began looking for “a new money financing solution” to “provide it the flexibility necessary to catch up on vendor payments” and “address” its first interest payment ($120 million or so) on the $2.2 billion junk bond, which was due June 30. Saks hoped to arrange for the new financing by mid-May 2025. On April 28, the company announced it had secured commitments for a package of $350 million in a new money financing facility from SLR Credit Solutions, a private credit provider founded by Michael Gross, an early partner at Apollo. Alas, it turned out, “the SLR financing could not be executed on the terms of the commitments previously obtained from SLR.” That’s when Saks embarked on its liability management exercise, or L.M.E.—otherwise known around Wall Street as “creditor-on-creditor violence”—which pitted some holders of the $2.2 billion Saks junk bond against others. In late June, some creditors agreed to provide Saks Global with up to $600 million of new financing in exchange for improving their position in the Saks capital structure. It was a coercive process: Participate in the new financing and get a leg up on your fellow creditors in the event of a bankruptcy, or don’t participate and become a junior creditor to those who did provide the new financing. But the L.M.E. was fully allowed by the covenants in the bond indenture. (Disclosure: Earlier this year, Saks sued Puck over our coverage of its financial condition.)

A MESSAGE FROM GLENMEDE

But it wasn’t all bad news: “Company data indicates that when stores have inventory, the inventory sells,” Weinsten continued. The run-rate “synergies,” expected to come in at $150 million by the end of 2025, were actually around $300 million. Since August, Saks has had one unified “merchandising platform,” allowing the company to “maximize its working capital efficiency.” He also explained that Saks’ customers are loyal, with “retention rates” for customers spending at least $10,000 a year exceeding 90 percent. (You know who you are…) “However,” he wrote, the company “needs debt relief and substantial additional funding to take advantage of these positive indicators.” (A spokesperson for Saks Global did not respond to a request for comment.)

After “intense negotiations,” Saks determined that the “best path forward” was to obtain a DIP—a debtor-in-possession facility—from a group of existing creditors, who will provide $1 billion in “new money” during the course of the Chapter 11 proceedings, as well as an additional $500 million in financing if and when Saks exits bankruptcy protection. Weinsten offered a note of optimism: “This vital liquidity boost, along with the benefits of the chapter 11 process, will give the Company critical debt relief and cash for its operations, allowing the Debtors to emerge from bankruptcy with a stronger financial foundation,” he wrote. Once all this mishegas is behind it, Saks can “reestablish its credibility and relationships with key brand partners and other important business partners, to play a central role in shaping the luxury retail industry well into the future.”